Will FWC Fuel Surcharges Push Your Fixed-Price Projects into an MFR Crisis?
- John Merlo
- May 18
- 18 min read
Key Takeaways
The Fair Work Commission's emergency fuel cost recovery orders can capture parties within a road transport contractual chain, which may include Queensland head contractors where the specific contractual structure of their project confirms they are a primary party — potentially requiring mandatory fortnightly transport rate adjustments even on fixed-price builds. Whether a building company is captured depends on its contracts and requires a project-by-project analysis.
Absorbing these unrecoverable supply-chain surcharges may rapidly deplete project margins, which can trigger a breach of your Queensland Building and Construction Commission QBCC Minimum Financial Requirements (MFR) current ratio or net tangible assets.
Directors facing severe cash-flow deterioration from upstream transport levies should immediately assess whether injecting personal funds or triggering a section 588GA safe harbour restructuring is the more viable strategy.
Where a building company is confirmed to be a primary party in a road transport contractual chain, failing to implement reasonable steps to ensure the levy flows down the chain exposes it to civil penalties under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), compounding the financial distress.
Your structural steel delivery is scheduled for Friday morning on a major Brisbane commercial site, and your lead materials subcontractor has just dropped a new, non-negotiable invoice variation on your desk. They aren't asking for a standard margin increase; they are passing through a mandatory transport rate adjustment dictated by the Fair Work Commission’s new emergency fuel cost recovery orders. Because your head contract is locked into a fixed-price arrangement, every cent of that unrecoverable supply-chain surcharge eats directly into your remaining project profit. The commercial reality is that absorbing these compounding transport levies without upstream recovery threatens to rapidly degrade your company's working capital, putting your entire Queensland building licence at risk if you breach the minimum financial requirements.
How Section 15RA Deeming Provisions May Capture Head Contractors
You are likely frustrated, wondering why a building business that doesn't own or operate a single haulage truck is suddenly responsible for policing transport fuel levies. At this stage, the priority is understanding exactly how federal legislation legally bridges the gap from the delivery driver at the bottom of the supply chain directly to your commercial doorstep, overriding your standard subcontracts.
Statutory FWC Civil Penalties vs Traditional Contractual Rise-and-Fall Provisions
When a regulatory agency issues an order governing a supply chain, those obligations operate entirely outside the boundaries of your standard commercial agreements. A Road Transport Contractual Chain Order (RTCCO) creates independent statutory liability that bypasses standard fixed-price construction contracts in Queensland.
Traditional construction rise-and-fall provisions are private contractual mechanisms designed to manage material or labour inflation between two direct parties. In contrast, an RTCCO is a public regulatory mechanism enforced by the Fair Work Commission (FWC) under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). It imposes strict, non-negotiable minimum payment standards across an entire sequence of contracting parties. Because this is a statutory liability pathway, you cannot contract out of these obligations by relying on existing fixed-price clauses or broad subcontractor indemnities; the regulatory requirement to adjust rates supersedes those private limitations.
The Potential Exposure for Principal Contractors Under Section 15RA
Head contractors in the building industry often mistakenly assume they are exempt from transport regulations simply because they do not directly employ truck drivers or operate heavy vehicles. This assumption fails to account for the broad deeming provisions engineered into the legislation.
Under s 15RA of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the law defines a road transport contractual chain as "a chain or series of contracts or arrangements... under which work is performed for a party to the first contract or arrangement in the chain or series by a regulated road transport contractor". A primary party is a person described in s 15RA(2)(a) and (3) of the Act — broadly, a party to the first contract or arrangement in the chain. The legislation intentionally ignores the physical distance between the head contractor and the driver, drawing principal contractors strictly into the regulatory compliance net.
The practical consequence of this is illustrated clearly in the construction context by analysis of the RTCCO, which poses the following representative chain: Project Proponent — Head Contractor — Earthworks Subcontractor — Haulage Contractor — Transport Subcontractor — Driver. On that structure, the Head Contractor sits two full steps upstream from the haulage engagement and has no direct contractual relationship with the driver whatsoever. Despite that commercial distance, the broad "performed for" drafting, combined with the s 15RA(5) deeming mechanism, means a court or the Fair Work Ombudsman could reasonably take the view that the driver's work is performed for the Head Contractor.
This position is genuinely unresolved. Whether a head contractor is a "primary party" — that is, a party to the first contract or arrangement in the road transport contractual chain — depends on the specific structure of the contracts in question, and entities that simply purchase goods or services where transport is incidental and arranged further down the chain will not automatically be captured. Major law firms advising on the RTCCO have recommended that entities in this position conduct a project-by-project contractual analysis and take an investigatory approach rather than assuming automatic liability. That said, building companies that simply do nothing while waiting for a definitive ruling are accepting real regulatory risk.
Your subcontracts may already be exposing your licence to federal civil penalty liability — without you knowing it. Request an urgent contractual analysis from Merlo Law before your next payment cycle. Contact us today
The more prudent commercial response, and the one adopted by sophisticated primary parties in other supply chains since April 2026, is to conduct that contractual analysis promptly, and where the analysis discloses meaningful exposure, build compliance workflows accordingly, rather than bet on a narrow interpretation surviving FWO scrutiny.
In practice, the building companies most exposed are those that have simply continued issuing standard subcontract packages without conducting any analysis of whether they sit within a road transport contractual chain, and without adding any RTCCO-specific pass-through clause or fortnightly review mechanism where the analysis confirms they are captured. Assuming without analysis that a freight forwarder or materials supplier sitting between them and the delivery driver absorbs all the regulatory exposure is a position that has no clear basis in the current legislation and which has not been tested before any court.
The $2.00 Diesel Trigger and Fortnightly Adjustment Mechanism
The Fair Work Commission's intervention in the transport sector is not structured as a permanent, flat rate hike. The 2026 Fuel Cost Recovery RTCCO operates as a dynamic, time-sensitive procedural mechanism linked directly to external market data.
Specifically, the core pass-through obligations are tied to a diesel price trigger threshold of $2.00 per litre. The framework requires mandated fortnightly (or twice-monthly) rate adjustments to ensure cost recovery for operators while the fuel price remains elevated. The core obligations are set out in clause 4 of the RTCCO. Under clause 5.3, the order features a self-suspending mechanism: if the weekly average national terminal gate price for diesel — as measured in the weekly diesel price report of the Australian Institute of Petroleum — falls below $2.00 per litre, the clause 4 pass-through requirements automatically cease to operate. As at the week ending 10 May 2026, the national terminal gate price for diesel remains well above that threshold, confirming that clause 4 obligations are presently active. This figure is updated weekly by the AIP, and building companies should verify the current price against the AIP weekly diesel prices report at the time of reading to confirm whether obligations remain on foot. This dynamic structure, enabled by the Fair Work Amendment (Fairer Fuel) Act 2026 (Cth), forces building companies to maintain highly agile and switchable payment administration systems rather than relying on static contract variations.
Decision Journey: Injecting Personal Capital vs Triggering Safe Harbour
You realise these unrecoverable fortnightly levies will obliterate the remaining margin on your current fixed-price multi-residential build, pushing the project into a loss. At this critical juncture, you must decide whether to personally fund the gap to maintain your QBCC financial metrics, or pause and initiate a formal safe harbour restructuring strategy before trading whilst insolvent. This section outlines the practical decision sequence you face, detailing how to evaluate the risk to your personal assets and when to formally restructure rather than attempting to trade out of a deepening hole.
When Absorbed Surcharges Threaten Your QBCC Net Tangible Assets
Unrecovered supply-chain surcharges on fixed-price projects can rapidly erode a building company's working capital, triggering a reportable breach of QBCC minimum financial requirements.
When you are locked into a head contract and forced to absorb transport sector levies, that sustained financial outflow directly damages your project profitability. As cash reserves drain to cover the mandated variations, the company's working capital depletes, which in turn degrades the two core financial metrics that underpin your QBCC licence: a current ratio of at least 1.0 and a net tangible asset position of at least $0. Beyond these floor thresholds, the QBCC Regulatory Guide for MFR and Annual Reporting (March 2026) requires licensees to lodge a new MFR Report if their net tangible asset position decreases by more than 30 per cent from the last accepted figure (for SC1 to Category 3 licensees) or more than 20 per cent (for Category 4 to 7 licensees), or if revenue exceeds the last accepted maximum by more than 10 per cent. A sustained series of unrecovered transport levies on a fixed-price project is precisely the kind of event that can trigger these thresholds rapidly and without warning.
This creates a separate exposure channel, as falling below the required financial thresholds jeopardises your regulatory standing and ability to continue operating in Queensland. If you are considering bridging this gap with your own funds to prop up the balance sheet, you should seek independent commercial law advice to ensure you are executing a sound financial strategy rather than simply throwing good money after bad. Maintaining your QBCC minimum financial requirements is critical, but it should not come at the expense of uncalculated personal exposure.
Merlo Law's construction and insolvency team acts regularly for Queensland and NSW building company directors navigating precisely this inflection point — where a fixed-price project loss threatens to cascade into a reportable MFR breach and, ultimately, licence suspension. Our approach is to run a concurrent triage: assessing the current ratio and NTA impact against your specific QBCC licence category, while simultaneously identifying whether a capital injection or a documented safe harbour course of action provides the more defensible path forward. Instruct our team early, and that dual-track analysis can often be completed before the next QBCC reporting obligation falls due.
Initiating Safe Harbour Before Insolvent Trading Liability Attaches
At what point should you stop funding the losses and seek restructuring protection? If it becomes apparent that the cumulative weight of these unrecoverable transport levies will likely cause cash flow insolvency, directors should promptly evaluate safe harbour restructuring options.
Utilising the protection for a safe harbour building company under Safe harbour (s 588GA) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) may offer a procedural mechanism to restructure debts while retaining control of the business. However, this defence typically requires you to develop a course of action that is reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company than immediate administration or liquidation. Before relying on the safe harbour defence, directors should confirm that two hard disqualifying conditions under s.588GA(4) of the Corporations Act are not present: the company must not have outstanding employee entitlements (including superannuation), and it must be compliant with all of its ATO tax reporting and lodgement obligations. If either condition is not met, the safe harbour defence is unavailable.
In a construction company context, where superannuation obligations and ATO remittances are already under pressure from margin erosion, these disqualifying conditions can crystallise quickly and without warning. Separately, the factors a court will consider in assessing whether a director genuinely took the safe harbour course of action — including whether the company maintained appropriate financial records, obtained qualified advice, and took steps to prevent misconduct by officers — are set out in the non-exhaustive list in s.588GA(2). These are not additional entry requirements, but they are the evidentiary landscape a director will need to navigate if the defence is later tested. Engaging an insolvency adviser before the safe harbour is relied upon — rather than after — is essential to confirm that neither disqualifying condition applies and that a documentable course of action is in place. Delaying this assessment can be detrimental, as the protection might not apply if debts are incurred after the point of insolvency without a valid, documented plan in place.
Failing to implement this strategy early is likely to expose you to claims regarding an insolvent trading director Queensland if the business eventually fails. Courts often scrutinise whether the timing and execution of the restructuring plan genuinely satisfy the statutory elements, meaning early engagement with an advisor can significantly increase the likelihood of a successful defence.
Assessing the Financial Cost of Delaying External Administration
A "wait and see" approach can severely escalate your personal financial risk when margins collapse from unrecoverable transport costs. Continuing to incur subcontractor and supply chain debts without a reasonable prospect of payment is likely to constitute a breach of your director duties building company.
This inaction may create a multi-step causal chain of liability. As the company's cash flow deteriorates, a failure to remit PAYG or superannuation obligations on time can trigger a director penalty notice Queensland from the ATO, attaching liability directly to you personally. Failing to act decisively on the appointment of a voluntary administration building company often restricts your strategic options, as delaying formal external administration may increase the likelihood that personal guarantees are called upon by suppliers. Furthermore, protracted trading while insolvent can expose your personal assets to liquidator recovery actions. Each link in this downward trajectory—from unpaid statutory obligations to potential personal liability—can often be mitigated, but the effectiveness of any intervention typically depends on swift, proactive decision-making before the debts become insurmountable.
Evidentiary Burdens and the "Reasonable Steps" Defence
Knowing the liability exists, you are likely looking for a practical workaround—wondering if updating a sub-contract clause or paying a flat fee avoids the penalties. This section provides the exact evidentiary standard required to survive a Fair Work Ombudsman audit without facing severe civil penalty caps under the Act.
Building an FWO-Compliant Evidence Pack for Pass-Through Levies
To satisfy the reasonable steps defence against Fair Work Commission (FWC) enforcement, head contractors must typically demonstrate concrete actions ensuring that transport levies flow completely down the supply chain.
A primary party's obligation under the RTCCO framework extends beyond merely adjusting the rate paid to the immediate secondary party (such as a freight forwarder or logistics company). The legislation requires the primary party to take reasonable steps to ensure that the increased rate is passed down to the actual regulated road transport contractor. It should be noted that clause 4.3 of the RTCCO explicitly exempts primary parties that are small business employers — as defined in s.23 of the Fair Work Act — and that are not themselves road transport businesses from the clause 4.2 reasonable steps obligation.
Building companies that qualify as small business employers and do not operate road transport businesses should confirm whether this exemption applies to their circumstances before implementing the full monitoring workflow described in this section. During a Fair Work Ombudsman audit, verbal assurances are insufficient; you will generally need documented proof that your subcontracts mandated this pass-through and that you monitored compliance.
The Fair Work Commission's own published guidance on the RTCCO draws an explicit analogy between the "reasonable steps" obligation and the chain of responsibility provisions under the Heavy Vehicle National Law — and that comparison is instructive for building company directors trying to understand what the evidentiary bar actually looks like. Under chain of responsibility, regulators do not accept mere contractual references to compliance; they want demonstrated monitoring and documented follow-up. The FWO is likely to approach RTCCO audits in the same way.
The most useful real-world template for what "reasonable steps" requires in practice comes from the Commission's own published example: a primary party arranged a meeting with its freight company, requested invoices submitted to the freight company by owner-drivers, sought proof of payment to those drivers, then adjusted its own rate to the freight company accordingly, and scheduled a fortnightly review. That documented sequence — the meeting, the invoice request, the proof of payment, the rate adjustment, the diary-locked review — is effectively the minimum evidence trail a building company needs to be able to reproduce.
A head contractor who simply emails their concrete supplier "please comply with the RTCCO" and adjusts the next payment by a rough fuel-cost estimate has almost certainly not discharged the obligation. The word "steps" is plural and process-oriented; the Fair Work Ombudsman will be looking for a repeatable, documented workflow, not a one-time administrative gesture.
Why Generic Rise-and-Fall Clauses May Fail Section 536NP Audits
Warning: Assuming without review that existing rise-and-fall clauses in standard subcontracts automatically satisfy the RTCCO may expose your building company to significant civil penalties during a regulatory audit.
Many directors assume that existing inflationary buffers in a building contract will satisfy new federal transport surcharges. This assumption requires careful scrutiny. Under Section 536NP of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), a person must not contravene a term of a road transport contractual chain order, and failing to comply exposes the business to civil penalties. The RTCCO does, however, include explicit satisfaction provisions in clause 4.6: obligations are taken to be met where a party complies with a rise-and-fall formula, cost model or cost benchmark in an applicable industrial instrument, collective agreement or contract that accounts for recovery of the increased cost of fuel, or an ongoing or special arrangement in the contractual chain that adjusts rates by reference to an agreed rise-and-fall formula or benchmarking methodology. This means some existing contractual mechanisms may already satisfy the RTCCO without further amendment. The critical question is whether your existing clause genuinely captures recovery of the increased cost of fuel measured from the 6 March 2026 baseline and operates at the required fortnightly or twice-monthly cadence.
A clause benchmarked solely to the CPI, to a general materials price index, or to a state industrial instrument baseline that does not address fuel cost recovery at the required frequency is unlikely to satisfy those two specific requirements. The civil penalty exposure for contraventions of s 536NP is governed by Section 539 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). As verified against the primary legislation, a contravention of s 536NP carries a maximum civil penalty of 60 penalty units for an individual and, by operation of the body corporate multiplier in s 546(2)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), five times the individual maximum — being 300 penalty units — for a body corporate. At the current Commonwealth penalty unit value of $330, prescribed by Section 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and in force for offences committed on or after 7 November 2024, the maximum penalties are $19,800 per contravention for an individual and $99,000 per contravention for a body corporate. Note that penalty unit values are subject to periodic indexation; the next scheduled indexation occurs on 1 July 2026.
As at the date of this article, the AFSA penalty unit schedule confirms the value remains $330. Readers publishing or relying on this article on or after 1 July 2026 should verify the then-current penalty unit value against the AFSA published schedule, as the scheduled indexation on that date will increase the maximum penalties above the figures stated here.
A single non-compliant subcontract package could expose your business to $99,000 in penalties — per contravention. Secure your commercial position now: instruct Merlo Law to audit your existing rise-and-fall clauses against the RTCCO compliance criteria before the next fortnightly adjustment date. Request an urgent clause review →
Furthermore, whether any existing rise-and-fall clause satisfies the section 536NP compliance threshold requires a two-part assessment.
First, does the clause address recovery of the increased cost of fuel measured from the 6 March 2026 reference date stipulated in the RTCCO's definition of "increased cost of fuel"? Second, does it operate at the fortnightly or twice-monthly cadence required by the order? A clause that benchmarks solely to the CPI, to a state industrial instrument baseline unconnected to fuel costs, or to a general materials price index will not, on its face, satisfy those two specific requirements and should not be relied upon. By contrast, a clause that references diesel prices or the AIP terminal gate price and adjusts at the required interval may well satisfy clause 4.6 of the RTCCO, and the FWC explicitly contemplated that many existing commercial arrangements would do so. The key point is that relying on an existing clause without reviewing it against those two criteria leaves the head contractor exposed to civil penalty liability that a brief contractual audit could have avoided.
Establishing Ongoing Monitoring Protocols for Subcontractors
Continuous verification of subcontractor transport payments is essential to satisfy the reasonable steps defence against FWO enforcement in Queensland. To manage this risk while the emergency order remains active above the fuel threshold, you should establish rigorous monitoring protocols.
Implement a structured review of your payment claim process to demand evidentiary documentation from secondary contractors confirming that the levy has been passed down to the individual driver.
Require statutory declarations from your immediate logistics and supply providers stating their compliance with the RTCCO fortnightly adjustments.
Periodically audit a sample of the transport invoices submitted by your secondary contractors against the published AIP terminal gate diesel price to ensure alignment.
Maintain a central compliance register documenting every step taken to verify the pass-through, which can be produced immediately if regulatory inquiries arise.
The practical difficulty that arises with the fortnightly review cycle is that it generates an administrative burden most building company procurement teams were not resourced to absorb when the RTCCO took effect in April 2026. The temptation — and a common mistake — is to treat the first fortnightly adjustment as a once-off variation to the subcontract, issue an updated purchase order, and then allow the review cycle to lapse. That approach fails to satisfy the ongoing character of the reasonable steps obligation.
A more defensible workflow involves linking the fortnightly review directly to your existing payment claim cycle: when a subcontractor payment claim lands, your accounts payable team should be triggering a matching request for that subcontractor's evidence of downstream adjustment before the claim is approved and released. Tying the compliance verification to an existing payment gateway rather than creating a parallel administrative system is significantly easier to sustain across a multi-project business and produces a natural audit trail in your project management or accounting software without requiring a separate compliance platform.
If you are unsure whether your current procurement workflows meet these stringent evidentiary burdens, it is prudent to get legal advice to refine your compliance strategy. Failure to properly monitor these obligations not only invites federal penalties but can also impact your Minimum Financial Requirements standing, and accumulating unresolved commercial disputes may potentially attract QBCC - Demerit points.
Merlo Law has developed practical RTCCO compliance workflow templates specifically for Queensland and NSW head contractors operating across multi-project pipelines, drawing on our experience advising building businesses through the chain-of-responsibility enforcement landscape since the RTCCO came into effect in April 2026. Rather than requiring clients to build a parallel compliance platform from scratch, our team integrates a documented pass-through verification protocol directly into the client's existing payment claim and subcontract administration processes — producing the evidence trail a Fair Work Ombudsman audit will demand, without the administrative overload. Contact our construction law team to request a compliance workflow assessment tailored to your current project portfolio.
Conclusion
When that next structural steel variation lands on your desk bearing an unrecoverable FWC transport surcharge, the financial risk to your Queensland building company is immediate and severe. As we have explored, the statutory framework under section 15RA of the Fair Work Act creates a genuine risk that head contractors sitting within a road transport contractual chain may be captured as primary parties — and the assumption that your building company is automatically insulated from downstream transport costs cannot be made without a proper contractual analysis. The reality is that absorbing these mandated, fortnightly levies on fixed-price projects can rapidly deplete your working capital, putting your critical QBCC minimum financial requirements at imminent risk.
You now understand that waiting for the diesel price to drop is not a viable strategy. The decision to either inject personal capital to prop up the company’s balance sheet or to initiate a formal section 588GA safe harbour restructuring must be made before your debts become insurmountable and your personal assets are exposed to insolvent trading claims. Furthermore, deploying generic contractual rise-and-fall clauses will likely fail to protect you from civil penalties if the Fair Work Ombudsman audits your compliance with the "reasonable steps" defence.
Your immediate next step is to conduct a triage of your current fixed-price subcontracts to identify your exposure to these transport surcharges. Gather your aged payables and your latest balance sheet and consult with a specialist construction lawyer to determine if a safe harbour restructuring plan is required to shield your licence and your livelihood.
FAQs
What is a road transport contractual chain order (RTCCO)?
A road transport contractual chain order is a regulatory mechanism issued by the Fair Work Commission that sets mandatory minimum payment standards — including fuel cost recovery surcharges — across a chain of road transport contracts. A "road transport contractual chain" is defined under section 15RA of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) as a series of contracts or arrangements under which work is performed in the road transport industry. The RTCCO imposes obligations on primary parties (those at the first contract in the chain) and secondary parties (those in subsequent contracts). Whether a building company qualifies as a primary party depends on the specific structure of its contracts and is a question requiring project-by-project legal analysis — it is not automatic. Where a head contractor is confirmed to be captured, the statutory obligations can override private fixed-price contractual arrangements.
Can my existing fixed-price building contract protect me from FWC fuel levies?
Relying solely on existing fixed-price contracts is unlikely to provide complete protection against FWC fuel levies for building companies that are confirmed to be primary or secondary parties in a road transport contractual chain. For those parties, the RTCCO operates as a statutory requirement that can override private commercial arrangements, and failing to comply may expose the business to civil penalties under section 536NP of the Fair Work Act. However, whether your building company is captured at all depends on the specific structure of your contracts and requires analysis before compliance obligations can be determined. Where a business is captured, it should also review whether any existing rise-and-fall clause already satisfies the RTCCO under clause 4.6, before assuming that new payment mechanisms are required.
How do FWC fuel surcharges affect my QBCC minimum financial requirements?
Absorbing unrecoverable FWC fuel surcharges can rapidly drain your project margins and working capital. If your cash reserves deplete to cover these mandatory variations, it may push your current ratio below the required minimum of 1.0 or reduce your net tangible assets below $0 — the two core financial floors set by the Queensland Building and Construction Commission (Minimum Financial Requirements) Regulation 2018. Beyond those floor thresholds, a net tangible asset decrease of more than 30 per cent from your last accepted figure (for SC1 to Category 3 licensees) or more than 20 per cent (for Category 4 to 7 licensees) requires lodgement of a new MFR Report. Dropping below these thresholds without notifying the QBCC or implementing a credible return-to-compliance plan jeopardises your Queensland building licence and may result in suspension or cancellation.
When should a building company director consider safe harbour restructuring?
A director should typically evaluate safe harbour restructuring options as soon as unrecoverable transport levies threaten to push a project into a loss that the company cannot absorb. Implementing a plan under section 588GA of the Corporations Act before the company becomes cash flow insolvent may provide a defence against potential insolvent trading liability. Delaying this decision can significantly increase the risk of personal exposure.
What constitutes "reasonable steps" to comply with the FWC fuel order?
To establish the reasonable steps defence, a head contractor must typically do more than just pay the surcharge to their immediate logistics provider. You will generally need to provide documented evidence, such as updated subcontract clauses or statutory declarations, demonstrating that you required the next party down the chain to pass the levy through to the actual driver. Failing to maintain an adequate evidence pack may result in adverse outcomes during a Fair Work Ombudsman audit.
When does the mandatory FWC fuel surcharge end?
The 2026 Fuel Cost Recovery RTCCO features a dynamic, self-suspending mechanism based on external market data. The core pass-through obligations are triggered when the weekly average national terminal gate price for diesel reaches $2.00 per litre. If the price falls below this threshold, the mandatory rate adjustments automatically cease, requiring your business to maintain switchable payment systems rather than permanent rate hikes.
This guide is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For advice tailored to your specific circumstances, please contact Merlo Law.
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